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Abstract 
This article focuses on the manner in which Kazakh refugees who had fled 
from Xinjiang in 1949 and 1950 attracted American interest. These refugees were 
housed in refugee camps in Srinagar and finally immigrated to Turkey. American aid 
was extended to them through missionaries and by an anthropologist. Simultaneous-
ly, however, the involvement of the Americans caused the politicization of the Ka-
zakh refugees with respect to Kashmir-related issues. American interests at the local 
level were highlighted by Adlai Stevenson’s visit. 
J. Hall Paxton, the ex-American consul to Urumqi, maintained his attention 
on the Xinjiang refugees. This article considers the correspondence exchanged be-
tween Paxton and the Uyghur refugees who arrived in Srinagar earlier as a model of 
his efforts to include Kazakh migrants within America’s favor. This attention 
stemmed from both humanitarian interest and, more importantly, the strategic value 
of the refugees. 
Paxton’s appeal to Washington resulted in the adaption of the United States 
Escapee Program to incorporate Kazakh refugees, enabling their migration to Tur-
key. However, this program intended to utilize qualified escapees in covert opera-
tions. For the Americans, the Kazakh refugees represented the possibility of fulfilling 
their “political, psychological and intelligence” purposes, and could be considered as 
candidates for “Phase B” of America’s operations against Soviet Russia.  
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1. Introduction  
As Kara and Kul have argued in their chapters, the second wave of Kazakh 
refugees from Xinjiang included prominent personalities such as Alibek Hakim, 
Delilhan Canaltay, Hüseyin Teyci, and Sultan Şerif. These refugees, except Hüseyin 
Teyci’s group, were forced to leave northern Xinjiang in 1949 and 1950 due to the ad-
vance of the People’s Liberation Army into Xinjiang. They suffered from thirst, alti-
tude sickness, and extremely cold temperatures as they crossed the Taklamakan De-
sert, Tibet, and the Himalaya Mountains. Moreover, they feared that the Chinese 
communist soldiers would catch up with them. Most of the refugees managed to 
reach Ladakh in August 1951 despite the serious loss of their livestock, their house-
holds, and even the lives of many of their peers. They were finally permitted to enter 
Indian territory,1 and moved to Srinagar, where they were settled in two refugee 
camps, Serai Safa Kadal and Kak Serai, used for the caravanserai of Yarkandi mer-
chants. It is estimated that around 340 refugees stayed at these camps.2 Ultimately, 
the refugees immigrated to Turkey between 1952 and 1954 and were settled in vari-
ous cities of Anatolia such as Salihli (Manisa) and Ulukışla (Niğde). 
The story of their escape from communist rule has been told by scholars, 
travelers, journalists, and by other migrants. Some remarkable narratives apart from 
Ingvar Svanberg’s survey, Kazak Refugees in Turkey (1989) include: Godfrey Lias’s Ka-
zak Exodus (1956), Milton Clark’s article in National Geographic Magazine (1954), and 
Frank Bessac’s autobiography titled Death on the Chang Tang (2006). In particular, a 
color photo of Alibek on horseback published with Clark’s National Geographic article3 
has served as a symbol for freedom seekers who escaped communist pressure to 
settle in Turkey along with the Kazakh refugees. 
The texts mentioned above focus on the process of the exodus of Kazakh 
refugees from their homeland to the “free world” and narrate the tragic experiences 
they encountered on the way. In fact, the value they offered to American interests 
have not been accorded much attention. The mere attribution of a longing for free-
1      The Times (London), Aug. 8, 1951; Oct. 6, 1951; Oct. 22, 1951; Nov. 3, 1951; Nov. 17, 1951. 
2      Kali Beg [Alibek Hakim] and Hamza [Uçar] to John Hall Paxton, Mar. 13, 1952, John Hall 
Paxton Papers, Yale University Library, New Haven, CT; John Stanwell-Fletcher, Pattern of 
the Tiger (Boston: Little Brown, 1954), 138. 
3      Milton J. Clark, “How the Kazakhs Fled to Freedom: Decimated by Chinese Reds and the 
Hazards of a Hostile Land, Nomads of the Steppes Trekked 3,000 Miles to Kashmir,” Na-
tional Geographic Magazine 106, no. 5 (1954): 629.  
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dom as the motive for a people’s migration to Turkey would be boring and ethnocen-
tric. The issues of these refugees, who were tiny in number, were finally forwarded 
to Washington, enabling the refugees to emigrate to Turkey. This paper refers to doc-
uments and to several contemporary texts that have not been adequately referenced 
in previous studies to focus on the American aid extended to Kazakh refugees both 
from the local and diplomatic perspective. By examining the motivations of those 
who provided the support, the paper elucidates that the Americans viewed the Ka-
zakh refugees as potential “political, psychological and intelligence” resources that 
could be utilized for covert operations against their communist enemies.  
 
2. Approaches to Kazakh Refugees in Srinagar: Aiding and Politicizing 
Them and Their Acquisition of American Favors 
Florence Percy  
The American Embassy in New Delhi was first to pay attention to the Ka-
zakh refugees. However, its approach remained indirect and informal. Florence Pear-
cy, the wife of geographic attaché Etzel Pearcy, unofficially investigated the condition 
of Kazakh refugees in early November 1951 upon the demand of the Embassy’s staff. 
Pearcy submitted a brief report to the Embassy at the request of the Tolstoy Founda-
tion in New York.4 According to this report, she visited the refugee camp in Serai Sa-
fa Kadal, where she saw nomadic tents “somewhat like an igloo.” Around 60 widows 
and 40 children “of those who lost their lives in the fight for personal freedom” were 
“living and sleeping outside on a verandah.” There were around a hundred children 
of school-going age. “Kazakhs seemed hungry for education,” Pearcy says, “not only 
for their children, but for themselves.” She reported the hopes of an elder leader that 
America would offer not just monetary help, but also support for education.5 
In her letter to Hall Paxton, who will be mentioned later, Pearcy pointed out 
that “the Kazakhs were eminently deserving of any help that we may be able to give 
them.”6 Her investigation must have prompted the New Delhi Embassy to begin 
helping the Kazakh refugees.  
4      Tolstoy Foundation had relieved a small refugee group of the Russian Old Believers who 
had left Xinjiang in 1947 and reached to Calcutta in 1951 by similar way of Kazakh refugees. 
Scott Moss, A History of the Tolstoy Foundation 1939–1989, http://www.tolstoyfoundation.org/
pdfs/tf_history_s-moss_.pdf, 18–21 (accessed Nov. 12, 2018).  
5      Florence Pearcy to Paxton, Nov. 18, 1951, National Archives and Records Administration 
[NARA], College Park, MD, RG 59, Box 5645, NND 822910, 893.411/1-852.  
6      Ibid.  
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Donald Ebright 
However, the Embassy preferred indirect means of support. In early 1952, a 
social welfare attaché mentioned the Kazakh refugees to missionary volunteer Don-
ald Ebright, who served as the director of Refugee and Famine Relief for the National 
Christian Council (NCC) of India (1948–52). The responsibility for relief activities fell 
on Ebright’s shoulders because “this was not a job the American Embassy should un-
dertake.”7 
Perhaps the American Embassy avoided direct aid to Kazakh refugees for 
reasons that could be asked to Uyghur migrants who had sought asylum in Kashmir 
prior to Kazakhs since 1950. Their leaders, İsa Yusuf Alptekin and Mehmet Emin 
Buğra, met the Ambassador Loy Henderson and expressed their hope for American 
aid for relief to the refugees and for their organization in February 1950.8 Though 
Henderson was personally sympathetic to these refugees, the Embassy feared that 
certain Indian officials and the public might resent any indirect US relief to Uyghur 
refugees because India herself had millions of refugees (Washington shared such 
concern9). He reported that the Indian Government feared being accused of harbor-
ing the enemies of communist China, and that the government suspected that the 
Uyghur refugees may be sympathetic to Pakistan because of their shared religion 
and that some of the refugees may even act as Pakistan’s agents.10 Thus, the Embassy 
entrusted relief activities for Kazakh refugees to Ebright. 
At first, Ebright contacted Dr. Phillip Edmonds, a director of the British 
Church Missionary Society School in Srinagar, from which most of the top-ranking 
Kashmir officials had graduated. Then, the Tolstoy Foundation offered substantial 
funds to support Xinjiang Kazakh refugees. In February 1952, Ebright opened a bank 
7      Donald F. Ebright, Free India: The First Five Years; An Account of the 1947 Riots, Refugees, 
Relief, and Rehabilitation (Nashville: Parthenon Press, 1954), 124.  
8      Loy Henderson to Dean Acheson, Feb. 6, 1950, NARA, RG 59, Box 5645, NND 822910, 
893.411/2-1650. They kept in touch with the American Embassy until Alptekin migrated to 
Turkey in 1954. In his memoir, Alptekin recalls that the Embassy’s staff members told him 
that America might go to war against Communist China and asked him whether rebels 
against China in Xinjiang would help in such an event. Ömer Kul, haz., İsa Yusuf Alptekin’in 
Mücadele Hatıraları: Esir Doğu Türkistan İçin (Ankara: Berikan Yayınevi, 2007), 2: 15.  
9      Department of State to the Embassy, New Delhi, Mar. 17, 1950, NARA, RG 59, Box 5645, 
NND 822910, no number.  
10     Henderson to Acheson, Apr. 15, 1950, NARA RG 59, Box 5645, NND 822910, 893.411/4-
1550.  
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account for the relief fund and immediately sent Edmonds in Srinagar the first 
check.11 
The Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah, supported 
the aid to the Kazakh refugees. The Kashmir government housed the refugees in two 
caravanserais, and Sheikh Abdullah appointed a relief committee. Ebright stated that 
“it was fortunate” for the smooth operations of the relief activity that Sheikh Abdul-
lah “took a personal interest in the refugees and was a personal friend of Dr. Ed-
monds.”12 
While engaging in relief activities such as the supply of food, clothing, and 
medical care, Ebright also sought land to resettle the Kazakh refugees because they 
did not want to travel any more. The Sind Valley was suggested, but it was already 
overpopulated. The Revenue Minister mentioned Uri. Ebright prepared to donate to 
the refugees sheep that they lost on the trail. Cows were also required, so it was sug-
gested the Mennonites or Brethren to start a “heifer for the Himalayas” or “cows for 
the Kazakhs” campaign.13 Ebright left India in 1952, and Donald E. Rugh succeeded 
his directorship. 
  
 Donald Rugh and Phillip Edmonds 
Although Ebright was not himself accused, some other foreigners in Kash-
mir were suspected of furthering a political mission in their dealings with the Ka-
zakh refugees. Rajpori, Kaul, and Kumar, Indian leftists, denounced these people, 
saying “not only do they collect information… but also encourage pro-Pakistani ac-
tivities and ideas” and “have done indiscriminate propaganda against the dangers of 
Communism.”14 In their eyes, missionaries, anthropologist, the United Nations Mili-
tary Observers Group (UNMOG), and the U.S. Embassy staff members plotted to-
gether, and they were closely associated with Kashmir’s Prime Minister Sheikh Ab-
dullah. Kazakh refugees were regarded as being involved in this anti-communist, 
pro-Pakistani, and “independent Kashmir” oriented circle.15 It should be added that 
11     Ebright, Free India, 124–25.  
12     Ibid., 132–33.  
13     Ibid., 133–34. 
14  Ghulam Mohammad Mir Rajpori and Manohar Nath Kaul, Conspiracy in Kashmir 
(Srinagar: Social & Political Study Group, 1954), 27, 30–31.  
15   Accusation towards Kazakh refugees rose up after Sheikh Abdullah’s arrest, August 
1953. Hasan Oraltay, Hürriyet Uğrunda Doğu Türkistan Kazak Türkleri, 2. bs. (İstanbul: Türk 
Kültür Yayını, 1976), 272–73.  
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Sheikh Abdullah was alleged to have accepted “5,000 Kazakh refugees” from Central 
Asia (obviously exaggerated) while he neglected or did not allow other non-Muslim 
refugees from Pakistani Punjab and Kashmir.16  
According to Rajpori and Kaul, Donald Rugh was closely associated with 
the American Embassy, particularly with the social welfare attaché. It was argued 
that they had at first decided to settle the Kazakh refugees in Kashmir, but because of 
the political backgrounds of the refugee leaders, they altered this decision and 
planned to resettle them in Turkey. USA’s Church World Service liaised with Kash-
mir and the American Embassy in Turkey. Moreover, Rajpori and Kaul suspected 
Rugh of some special political “mission” besides the resettlement of Kazakhs.17 
 Phillip Edmonds, the principal of the British missionary school in Srinagar, 
was the most important personality among missionaries in Kashmir. He had lived in 
Kashmir for more than six years, and had forged close ties with the American Embas-
sy staff, UNMOG officers, the PM Sheikh Abdullah, and his advisers. In short, he 
“functioned as the chief link between the Americans and Sheikh Abdullah.”18 Rajpori 
and Kaul accused Edmonds of utilizing his position as a missionary and educational-
ist for varied political purposes, including advocacy for an independent Kashmir or 
the propagation of a pro-Pakistan orientation to Sheikh Abdullah.19 According to 
them, “his [Edmonds’] activities had a much wider range than entailed by his normal 
functions.”20 For example, he was condemned for conducting espionage and other 
subversive UNMOG activities for Pakistan or against India.21 
In addition, Edmonds engaged in relief fund and cultural activities with Ka-
zakh refugees. He also integrated them into political life. It was suspected that the 
major part of the relief fund money sent to him from the Tolstoy Foundation via 
Ebright and Rugh, “has gone to politically undesirable persons.”22 The following pas-
sage in Edmonds’ letter to the Times also aroused Kumar’s suspicions about his polit-
16     Hari Jaisingh, Kashmir: A Tale of Shame (New Delhi: UBSPD, 1996), 93–94; Pyarelal Kaul, 
Crisis in Kashmir (Srinagar: Suman Publications, 1991), 67–68; K. N. Pandita, “Demographic 
Change in Kashmir: The Bitter Truth,” in Jammu, Kashmir, Ladakh: Ringside Views, ed. Shyam 
Kaul and Onkar Kachru (New Delhi: Khama Publishers, 1998), 59.  
17     Rajpori and Kaul, Conspiracy, 27, 30–31.  
18     Vijay Kumar, Anglo-American Plot against Kashmir (Bombay: People’s Publishing House, 
1954), 202.  
19     Rajpori and Kaul, Conspiracy, 28–29.  
20     Ibid., 31. 
21     Ibid., 29–30; Kumar, Anglo-American, 202.  
22     Rajpori and Kaul, Conspiracy, 30. 
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ical intentions: 
a large number of the Kazakhs, … elected to stay here 
[Kashmir] largely because they felt they were nearer their 
homeland and because they believed they would be more like-
ly to play some part in returning when the time come.23  
It is obvious that America was a hopeful partner for Kazakh refugees in 
their politicization process. For example, Alibek Hakim told Rugh:  
We are sure that the Red tyranny must fall in the fight of all the 
free nations under the guidance of America upon whom we, 
the Turkistanis, look, as our sponsor. We are prepared to sacri-
fice to the last drop of our blood in this struggle. We pray for a 
better future which will be possible through the democratic 
countries, especially America.24  
 
Milton Clark 
While missionaries functioned significantly in settling and politicizing the 
refugees, American anthropologist Milton J. Clark influenced the manner in which 
the rest of the world viewed them. Clark was a doctoral student at Harvard Universi-
ty. When he read a news report of Kazakh refugees having appeared in Kashmir in 
late 1951, he recognized two opportunities and decided to go to Kashmir to visit with 
them to study them for his dissertation and to hear first hand, the survivors’ narra-
tives of the migration.25 
Soon after arriving in Kashmir in August 1952, Clark developed close rela-
tionships with the Kazakh and Uyghur refugees and engaged in anthropological in-
vestigation and cultural welfare activities, imparting English lessons to the refugees 
and their children. However, Rajpori and Kaul’s suspicious eyes also followed 
Clark’s activities. According to their accusations, Clark effected a comprehensive so-
cial and political survey with special reference to the frontier areas linking Kashmir 
with Central Asia and Tibet. He helped Kazakhs form an organization, preparing 
their statements and documents, and took Kazakh leaders out of town for more con-
fidential discussions. He met Sheikh Abdullah frequently and they discussed Central 
23     P. A. Edmonds, “Kazakhs on the Move: Building New Life in Kashmir,” The Times, Apr. 
21, 1953.  
24     Ebright, Free India, 132.   
25     Clark, “How the Kazakhs”: 622.  
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Asian politics and American foreign policy. In the US, Clark made important politi-
cal contacts with Republicans in the Far East lobby and maintained contact with the 
overseas news editor of the Christian Science Monitor, who sought information about 
the situation in Chinese Central Asia.26 In short, Clark was alleged to disguise his po-
litical agency as research. Rajpori and Kaul argued that “he was more suave and sub-
tler than Edmonds, and his techniques of work were more upto date.”27 
Their claim that Clark took Kazakh refugees to the mountains for filming is 
plausible.28 Such an allegation can be supported by Alibek’s son Hasan Oraltay and 
nephew Şirzat Doğru. According to Oraltay and Doğru, Clark stayed among the Ka-
zakhs to learn their language and customs. He had them set up nomadic tents in So-
namarg, a skirt of the Himalaya Mountains, 80 kilometers north-east of Srinagar. 
There, Clark encouraged the Kazakhs to wear national clothes, perform a kind of 
wedding ceremony, practice wrestling, dance, and make kumis. Kazakh refugees met 
his requests for the sake of introducing Turkestan and the Kazakh people.29 Thus, 
Clark reproduced national Kazakh life in Kashmir just like in the Altay villages. Of 
course, this endeavor was not a form of dilettantism. Photographs published in Na-
tional Geographic should be considered as a type of “political show” aiming to display 
freedom seekers who were able to successfully flee communist dominance and to 
begin rebuilding their lives in the free world. In a way, the photographs were meant 
to invoke feelings of sympathy for Kazakhs in the magazine’s readers. 
In assuming Clark’s political and intelligence tendencies, it is meaningful 
that İsa Yusuf Alptekin remembered Clark as an agent of the Office of Strategic Ser-
vices who landed in Kashmir, in Alptekin’s memory, by parachute. During a visit to 
New York in 1969, Alptekin also recalled that Clark collected information about Chi-
26     Rajpori and Kaul, Conspiracy, 31–32.  
27     Ibid., 31.  
28     Ibid., 32.  
29     Oraltay, Hürriyet Uğrunda, 272; Şirzat Doğru, Türkistan’a Doğru: Türkistan, Türkiye, 
Kazakistan Arasında Anılar, Düşünceler, Bilgi ve Belgeler (İzmir: Arena Matbaacılık, 2008), 157.  
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na.30 Moreover, Clark’s name appears again in the late 1950’s as the chief of the CIA 
station in Vientiane.31 
In any case, Rugh, Edmonds, and Clark engaged in relief and social welfare 
activities for Kazakh refugees in Kashmir in 1952 and 1953. The American ambassa-
dor in New Delhi, Chester Bowles, expressed his confidence in the ability and integ-
rity of these three individuals in his letter to Alibek. He also suggested that practical 
measures should be taken in the interests of all concerned through representatives of 
the Kazakhs and of the Kashmir government and through these three people.32 In 
short, Rugh, Edmonds, and Clark functioned as the informal channels of the Ameri-
can Embassy.  
   
Adlai Stevenson 
Another obvious political show was effected by Clark and Edmonds when 
Adlai Stevenson, a presidential candidate of the Democratic Party, visited a Kazakh 
refugee camp. Stevenson went on a world tour the year following his loss to Eisen-
hower in the 1952 election. He arrived in Srinagar on May 1, 1953 and met Sheikh 
Abdullah three times. Rajpori and Kaul insist that Stevenson evinced keen interest in 
the Kashmir problem, and emphasized direct talks between the Indian and Pakistani 
Prime Ministers while considering the wishes of local inhabitants. Rajpori and Kaul 
claim that leaning toward Sheikh Abdullah, Stevenson agreed with the independent 
Kashmir solution.33  
 Thus, Stevenson’s visit to the Kazakh refugees may be evaluated as an ex-
30     Reha Oğuz Türkkan, “İsa Yusuf Bek Öldü mü? Issız Acun Kaldı mı?,” Doğu Türkistan’ın 
Sesi, sy. 47 (1996): 5. Türkkan, a well-known Turkish nationalist who taught at Columbia 
University at that time, didn’t take Alptekin’s words seriously at first because he had been 
familiar with Clark. Immediately, Türkkan called Clark on the telephone, asked him “Let’s 
see now, whose voice is the voice of who will speak now?” Milton Clark quickly guessed 
Alptekin correctly.  
31     William J. Rust, Before the Quagmire: American Intervention in Laos, 1954–1961 (Lexington, 
KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2012), 59–60.  
32     Chester Bowles to Alibek, Nov. 20, 1952, Hasan Oraltay Private Archive, National Aca-
demic Library of Republic of Kazakhstan, Astana, Folder 14/14, 28.   
33    Rajpori and Kaul, Conspiracy, 56–58. However, it would be difficult to take their suspi-
cious eyes at value. During lunch with Stevenson, Sheikh Abdullah expressed he wanted 
out both India and Pakistan from Kashmir. “He was attacked in India as a Moslem and in 
Pakistan as a stooge of the Hindus.” Moreover, he was also impatient with the UN because 
its guarantees were worthless without a force. John Bartlow Martin, Adlai Stevenson and the 
World: The Life of Adlai E. Stevenson (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1977), 54.   
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tension of the US diplomacy on Kashmir and of Sheikh Abdullah’s affiliation with 
America as evidenced by his close association with Edmonds and Clark as men-
tioned earlier. Stevenson entered into a private discussion with Edmonds and Clark, 
who took him to a Kazakh refugee camp in Serai Safa Kadal on May 2.35  
On this visit, Stevenson noted:  
Girls in ancient costume sang their folk songs while we sat on 
rugs surrounded by headman of Tribe. Pure Turks. Speak 
Turkish. Origin of Turks. […] Chief made fine speech of appre-
ciate on for my visit; for refuge of Indian govt; for [those]… 
who died on the way. I responded – U.S. admires a people 
who value freedom more than life. Applause.36  
The Associated Press (AP) forwarded Stevenson’s description of Kazakh refugees as 
34     “Türkistan’dan Haberler,” Türkistan, sy. 3–4 (1953), 47.  
35    Rajpori and Kaul, Conspiracy, 28, 32, 57.  
36     Martin, Adlai Stevenson, 54.  
Fig. 1: Stevenson’s Visit to Serai Safa Kadal34  
? 52 ?
                                          
 
freedom seekers as follows: 
The American people deeply appreciate the heroism and cour-
age of the Kazaks in their arduous trek from their homeland 
across the snow-capped peaks and valleys of the Himalayas to 
the safety and freedom of Kashmir.  
Thus, Stevenson recognized them as people “who love freedom more than the com-
forts of life” and said that such people deserved “great respect.”37 
The next day, Kazakh delegates returned Stevenson’s call. “They had no 
friends but America,” Stevenson notes, “Indians didn’t want them; didn’t want to go to 
Turkey, wanted to go home. Many of their people wanted escape but India wouldn’t 
let them in.”38 Though their numbers were very small, Kazakh refugees were no 
longer insignificant. Although Şirzat Doğru was absent at that point, he told the au-
thor of this paper that they wanted to appeal to their existence as anti-communists in 
Srinagar.39 It may be asserted that a political show was arranged by Clark and Ed-
monds provided Kazakh refugees with the favor of a highly important American po-
litical figure who confirmed their status as freedom seekers.   
 
3. Hall Paxton: Attempt to Include Xinjiang Refugees  
“Not Forgetting You,” Uyghur Refugees 
Others outside Kashmir also paid attention to the Kazakh refugees. Jacobs 
argues that Yolbars Khan in Taipei and Alptekin and Mehmet Emin Buğra in Istan-
bul competed between themselves to attract the Xinjiang refugees to their sides.40 
Apart from this, the refugees in Srinagar also maintained contact with American dip-
lomat John Hall Paxton of Isfahan. In fact, Paxton’s attribution brought the Kazakh 
refugee problem to Washington’s attention. 
Since 1946, Paxton had served as consul to Urumqi, which was called Dihua 
at that time. He abandoned the consulate in August 1949 as the People’s Liberation 
Army approached Xinjiang. His party reached New Delhi after detouring the Takla-
makan Desert and crossing over the Karakoram Pass.41 After spending a year in 
37     The Boston Globe, May 3, 1953.  
38     Martin, Adlai Stevenson, 54. 
39     Şirzat Doğru, interview by author, Kemalpaşa, Izmir, Aug. 2013.     
40     Justin M. Jacobs, Xinjiang and the Modern Chinese State (Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 2016), 207–10. See also Chapter 5 in this book.    
41     Peter Lisagor and Marguerite Higgins, Overtime in Heaven: Adventures in the Foreign Ser-
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America, Paxton was appointed consul in Isfahan. He corresponded with leading Ka-
zakh refugees such as Delilhan Canaltay, Alibek Hakim, and Hüseyin Teyci between 
January and April of 1952, two months before his sudden death.42 
It would be useful at this juncture to focus on the Uyghur refugees who 
reached Kashmir earlier than the Kazakhs. In brief, the correspondence between Pax-
ton and the Uyghurs paved the way for the relief for Kazakh refugees. For example, 
Enver Şahkul of the US embassy in Ankara had served in the consulate of Urumqi 
and had escaped to India as a member of Paxton’s party. He was Paxton’s informant 
since December 1949. He forwarded to Paxton, in Washington, and later in Isfahan, 
the Xinjiang news and the circumstances of the Uyghur refugees in India. These refu-
gees could listen to the short-wave radio messages from Urumqi.43 Paxton always 
welcomed Şahkul’s reports concerning his “Yurt (homeland).”44 Thus, Paxton 
grasped that Alibek and Canaltay were among the 300 Kazakh refugees in Srinagar, 
that they had applied to Saudi Arabia for settlement but had been turned down, and 
that they were subsequently asking Turkey for asylum.45 
Paxton kept in touch with İsa Yusuf Alptekin, and also with the other refu-
gees in Srinagar. Some of them had been students of Paxton’s wife Vincoe, who had 
taught English in Urumqi.46 They appealed to Paxton in grievous voices. It should be 
noted at this point that some refugees hoped to receive education, even advanced 
medical training, in the US for serving their homeland. They had asked Paxton to 
mediate on their behalf in Washington47 through their organization, which was called 
vice (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1964), 173–206.  
42   Among these correspondences, Jacobs refers to following themes: a) Being killed of 
Douglas Mackiernan whom Hüseyin Teyci had treated in Gasköl; b) Delilhan Canaltay’s 
consultation on whether he should accept Kuomintang’s invitation to Taiwan; c) $300 per-
sonal check from Paxton for Kazakh refugees, which was divided equally among them. Ja-
cobs, Xinjiang, 200–1, 209.  
43     Enver Şahkul to Paxton, Dec. 5, 1949; Jan. 26, 1950; Mar. 13, 1950; Apr. 14, 1950; May 16, 
1950; Aug. 5, 1950; Sep. 5, 1950; Nov. 9, 1951; Mar. 11, 1952, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 
130, 2–4, 7, 9–11, 14–17, 24–25; Şahkul to Bertel E. Kuniholm, Mar. 21, 1951, Paxton Papers, 
Box 6, Folder 110, 35; Şahkul to Kuniholm, Apr. 9, 1951, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 130, 
22.   
44     Paxton to Şahkul, Apr. 5, 1951, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 110, 34; Paxton to Şahkul, 
Apr. 30, 1952, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 114, 20.  
45     Şahkul to Paxton, Nov. 15, 1951, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 130, 32.  
46    Murat Alptekin to Paxton, Mar. 30, 1951, Paxton Papers, Box 6 Folder 115, 39; Lisagor 
and Higgins, Overtime, 185.  
47     Muharrem Kari to Paxton, Jun. 10, 1950, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 120, 13; Abdurrauf 
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the Turkistan Refugee Committee and was located in Serai Safa Kadal.48 In fact, the 
committee’s president Ubaydullah (spelled as Abaidullah) reported that around 125 
refugees led by Hüseyin Teyici and Sultan Şerif arrived in Srinagar and stayed in the 
same serai, and that more 200 refugees in Ladakh were waiting for their Indian visas 
and for permission to enter Indian territory.49 
 Along with the other problems of the refugees, İsa Yusuf Alptekin engaged 
with the issue of education. He asked Paxton to mediate with Washington on their 
behalf for their youth to study in the US. “The Chinese Government did neither open 
any educational institutes in our country,” he alleged, “and nor allowed our boys 
and students to proceed to other countries for such purposes.” He saw the flight 
from Xinjiang as “an opportunity for them [Turkestani youths] to get some educa-
tion.” The loss of this opportunity due to the lack of finances signified “a great injus-
tice with them.” In addition, Alptekin cleverly calculated that “America will also be 
benefitted” if these students were to obtain their education in the US. He attached a 
list of 11 candidates aged 13 to 25 years.50 
Paxton, who was “still hoping that something more can be done for our 
friends” and “working on it several angles,”51 had devoted himself to engaging with 
the Americans on this issue. As of May 1951, however, he had found no solution.52 
Dawud Rashid,53 who had joined Paxton’s party to flee Xinjiang and was one of the 
above mentioned candidate students, fell into great disappointment not having 
heard from the American government. Ashamed of the parasitic life given to him by 
Alptekin in Srinagar, Rashid appealed to Paxton to help him obtain some work. “We 
have many hopes in America,” he wrote, “I have many hopes in you and am sure 
that you would not forget me.”54   
Kanat to Paxton, Jun. 17, 1950, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 126, 5; Ahmed Halimi and Polat 
Qadiri [Turfani] to Paxton, Jun. 29, 1950, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 133, 42; Settar Makbul 
to Paxton, Jun. 25, 1951, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 133, 25.  
48     Halimi and Qadiri to Paxton, Jun. 29, 1950; Jul. 24, 1950, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 
133, 42–43; Abaidullah [Ubaydullah] to Paxton, Apr. 12, 1951; Apr. 18, 1951; Oct. 8, 1951; 
Jan. 28, 1952, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 133, 48–50, 52–54. 
49     Ubaydullah to Paxton, Oct. 8, 1951. 
50     İsa Yusuf Alptekin to Paxton, Jun. 1, 1950, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 115, 11, 13–14. 
51     Paxton to Şahkul, Apr. 3, 1950, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 104, 13. 
52     Paxton to İsa Yusuf Alptekin, May 4, 1951, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 111, 1.  
53     Lisagor and Higgins, Overtime, 184.  
54   Dawud Rashid [David Rashid Osman] to Paxton, Jan. 30, 1952, Paxton Papers, Box 6, 
Folder 126, 2.  
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Paxton desired to avoid the refugees feeling disappointment toward Ameri-
ca. In his reply, Paxton calmed Dawud’s anxiety and wrote that he could not forget 
Dawud and their escape from Xinjiang, and that he was still pursing the matter of the 
scholarship. He hoped to discuss with Alptekin “all possibilities for education in the 
United States for you and other young people from “Yurt”.”55 
Needless to say, the most obvious sign of “not forgetting you” toward the 
refugees was donation. Paxton sent the US embassy in New Delhi a check for 300 
dollars.56 Ubaydullah, the president of the Turkistan Refugee Committee, thanked 
Paxton and the embassy staff member Douglas Forman for their donation of around 
1,450 rupees. However, the amount did not matter to him. Instead, “it shows how 
your goodself still remember us,” Ubaydullah referred to Paxton’s remembrance, 
“and it is really a matter of great pleasure for all of us that we have a friend like you 
and who remembers us in our present hour of plight.” According to him, the refu-
gees could also never forget that Paxton had not forgotten them, and that he had ex-
tended and increased his help toward them.57  
The exchanges that Paxton maintained with the Uyghur refugees were prior 
to and parallel with his correspondence with the Kazakhs. Such communications evi-
dence that Paxton’s sympathy and devotion to the Kazakh refugees, expressed in the 
form of the arrangement of scholarships and donation, was inherited from his feel-
ings for the Uyghurs.  
 
Subsequent “Not Forgetting You,” Kazakh Refugees 
On the other hand, the correspondence between Paxton and the Kazakh ref-
ugees, especially Delilhan Canaltay in Srinagar, began in November 1951.58 These 
letters symbolize the politicization of the Kazakh refugees. 
In his first letter to Paxton, Canaltay asked him to come to the serai, to wit-
ness their miserable conditions, and to help him and the Kazakh party. Like the Uy-
55     Paxton to Rashid, Feb. 18, 1952, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 113, 35.  
56     Clare H. Timberlake to Paxton, Apr. 5, 1951, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 133, 11.  
57     Ubaydullah to Paxton, Apr. 18, 1951; Apr. 29, 1951, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 133, 49–
50.  
58     Kazakh leaders such as Alibek Hakim and Hüseyin Teyci, who stayed in the Gasköl re-
gion, dispatched letters to Alptekin and Buğra in spring of 1951. Alptekin and Buğra started 
acting for the Kazakhs after they received those letters. They requested Ambassador Hen-
derson and the Indian government to approach the Tibetan government. After Kazakh refu-
gees fled to the Indian border of Ladakh, Buğra attempted to obtain permissions for them to 
enter India (Alptekin had gone to Saudi Arabia). Kul, Esir Doğu, 2: 20–29, 44–45, 53–54.   
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ghur refugees mentioned above, Canaltay’s message must have appealed to Paxton 
for mercy: “Whenever I remember your companionship of Uramchi [sic] I burst into 
tears.”59 
Receiving the letter finally on January 2, 1952, Paxton was “deeply moved.” 
He marveled at Canaltay’s perseverance and was delighted to hear from him. Excus-
ing himself for not visiting Srinagar for the time being, Paxton tactfully showed his 
affection for the Kazakhs as follows: “our continuing interest in the refugees from 
“yurt” which we have come to consider our own second country” and “never for-
getting your loyal friendship to our country and both of us.” Paxton encouraged 
Canaltay not to abandon hope because he had sought aids by all means.60  
Canaltay asked again Paxton to help Kazakh refugees and to explain their 
miserable conditions to his American friends for aid. “I too was a chairman of a king-
doom [sic],” he claimed as he recounted his misery, “but at present I am a friendless 
of [sic] helpless refugee.” According to him, all the Kazakh refugees in Srinagar and 
in Ladakh lacked money and friends.61 
Paxton immediately sent the refugees a $300 check, the same amount he had 
sent the Uyghurs, and each Kazakh leader including Ubaydullah wrote him a thank-
you letter.62 On the very same day that he wrote his letter of thanks to Paxton, how-
ever, Canaltay wrote another personal missive which may be considered negotiation 
for his personal profit. Canaltay described his misery, “a head worker of a Nation 
and a man equal to aking [sic]” fell into “a position not more than a begger [sic].” He 
requested Paxton to send him some money separately. Further, he expressed his 
wish to go back to his motherland and asked for Paxton’s opinion and help in this 
regard also.63 
When it appeared that Paxton did not agree with Canaltay’s proposed re-
turn to Xinjiang (“it would seem to imply cooperation with the very people who 
59   Dalile Khan Haji [Delilhan Canaltay] to Paxton, Nov. 27, 1951, Paxton Papers, Box 6, 
Folder 118, 27.  
60     Paxton to Canaltay, Jan. 3, 1952, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 113, 17.  
61     Canaltay to Paxton, Jan. 18, 1952, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 119, 53.   
62     Husayin Tayji [Hüseyin Teyci] to Paxton, Jan. 23, 1952, in Records of the Office of Chinese 
Affairs, 1945–1955 ([Wilmington, DE]: Scholarly Resources, [1989]), microfilm, 18: 589; 
Ubaydullah to Paxton, Jan. 28, 1952, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 133, 54; Canaltay to Pax-
ton, Jan. 28, 1958 in Records 18: 587.  
63     Canaltay to Paxton, Jan. 28, 1952, in Records 18: 588.       
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drove you out”),64 Canaltay apparently changed his mind and expressed the desire to 
go to the US. He asked Paxton to write to high ranking officers and to send him the 
requisite expenses, passports, and visas for his family, at least for a future visit. As 
Jacobs refers, Canaltay asked for Paxton’s opinion about whether or not he should 
accept Kuomintang’s invitation to go to Taiwan. Moreover, according to Canaltay’s 
letter, Donald Rugh visited the refugee camp on 27 February, gave out clothes and 
grains, and told the people about a relief plan to distribute sheep, cows, and cultiva-
tion tools in June. Canaltay appreciated Paxton because “It is only you who always 
informed and impressed your American friend to help us.”65 
In his last reply to Canaltay, Paxton suggested that he communicate with 
the Embassy in New Delhi about a visit to Taipei. In response to Canaltay’s wish to 
visit the US, Paxton merely replied that all he could do was pass on the request to the 
American authorities. Instead, Paxton proposed a scholarship to study in America as 
he had arranged for the Uyghur refugees.66 However much Paxton showed his sym-
pathies toward Canaltay and the other Kazakh refugees, he could not make rash 
promises in response to Canaltay’s requests. In fact, Washington did not allow it. In 
the confidential letters to Ambassador Henderson, Burton Berry, Acting Assistant 
Secretary of the Near East Affairs, the Department of State expressed its reluctance to 
accept refugees from Chinese Turkestan to the US. Upon the expiration of the Dis-
placed Persons Act on December 31, 1951, there was “no special legislative authority 
to deal with the problem of refugees.” Berry referred to the fact that a similar legisla-
tion might be enacted during that year, “but with [presidential and congress] elec-
tions coming up,” he added, “not much hope can be held out.” In addition, the Chi-
nese immigration quota, under which Turkestani refugees might qualify, was greatly 
oversubscribed.67 In short, Washington reviewed the Uyghur and Kazakh refugees 
within the legislative frame. 
Arranging scholarships for the Uyghur and Kazakh refugees was one of the 
few options Paxton could find. In fact, such a scholarship plan was later discussed 
between Alibek Hakim and the American Embassy in New Delhi. According to the 
64     Paxton to Canaltay, Feb. 11, 1952, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 113, 31. 
65     Canaltay to Paxton, Feb. 29, 1952, in Records 18: 596–97.  
66     Paxton to Canaltay, Mar. 29, 1952, in Records 18: 579.  
67   Burton Y. Berry to Henderson, Feb. 1, 1952, NARA, RG 59, Box 5645, NND 822910, 
893.411/1-852. 
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Ambassador, Chester Bowles, who succeeded Henderson, Alibek had proposed that 
four Kazakh students should be allowed to study in the US in addition to the four 
Uyghur candidates who had already been selected. Bowles replied that these Uy-
ghurs had been offered funds by private American citizens after careful considera-
tion, and that arranging similar scholarships for four Kazakhs would cause consider-
able difficulties. However, he also suggested the possibility that funds could be ob-
tained for courses higher than preliminary study if there were some applicants who 
were “considered to have adequate educational background and command of Eng-
lish to enable them to benefit by education in the United States.”68 
 According to William Anderson, a staff member of the Office of Chinese 
Affairs (CA), Department of State, who wrote some confidential memoranda in this 
regard, the CA took the responsibility for the case of one Uyghur student and it was 
agreed “in recent conversations with S/P [Policy Planning Staff] and CIA” that the 
CA would mediate with Georgetown University and the US embassy in New Delhi. 
It is worth noting that Anderson believed that the details of the financial sponsorship 
program would not be communicated to the embassy, and that the CA assumed that 
in this process a channel for helping or utilizing selected persons from Central Asia 
may be developed through the Committee for Free Asia, which founded the Radio 
Free Asia in 1951.69 Along with the Uyghur students, the CA also continued to func-
tion “as the primary action office in developing plans for assisting or utilizing select-
ed Kazakhs of Sinkiang origin” with the consent of the functionaries of the Office of 
South Asian Affairs.70  
 
Investment on Refugees 
Although Alibek appeared to have failed to confirm scholarships for the Ka-
zakh youth, it is very meaningful that “assisting” some Kazakh refugees was the re-
verse side of “utilizing” them. From the beginning, Paxton clearly stated his motiva-
tions for helping the refugees in several of his communications. In his letter to Canal-
tay, Paxton explained the reason for offering American aid as follows: “it chiefly due 
to your freedom-loving standards having evoked much American interest and the 
68    Bowles to Alibek. Nov. 20, 1952, Hasan Oraltay Private Archive, Folder 14/14, 28.  
69     William O. Anderson, memorandum, Aug. 25, 1952, “Memorandum for File,” in Records 
27: 270; Anderson to Alfred L. Jenkins, memorandum, Jan. 7, 1953, “Aid for Sinkiang Refu-
gees,” in Records 31: 1113.  
70     Ibid.       
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activity of the Embassy in New Delhi in presenting your case.”71 However, it would 
not be an exaggeration to assert that such humanitarian concerns and impressions, 
though they themselves could not be denied, also served to disguise America’s pur-
suing of its own interests. 
In January 1952, Ambassador Henderson in Teheran forwarded to the above 
mentioned Berry a copy of Paxton’s letter addressed to him. In this missive, Paxton 
emphasized that the importance of “the smallest gesture of aid” to the Uyghur refu-
gees in Kashmir would bring a disproportionate credit to the US. In other words, a 
tiny “investment” on these refugees would result in high returns, viz. American 
credit and Russian discredit throughout Muslim Central Asia. In fact, as of March 
1950 according to Paxton, the Policy Planning Staff had planned to resettle Uyghur 
refugees in the US and Paxton would be assigned to assist Alptekin who would ar-
rive by airplane first. Though this plan fell through, Paxton still continued to consid-
er this case seriously, saying “their problems deserve more sympathetic considera-
tion than they have yet been given.” In short, “these people should not be forgotten.” 
That was why Paxton had been interested in helping the Uyghur refugees and had 
appealed to Henderson although this issue was far removed from their contempo-
rary missions.72 
Similarly, in February 1952 Paxton told Garret Soulen, the consul in Cal-
cutta, the reason why he aided refugee groups who fled from communists. Paxton 
believed that Americans should respond to the refugees’ adherence to the ideals of 
liberty:  
I feel that people, who have demonstrated so conclusively their 
adherence to the ideals of liberty that we Americans also hold 
dear, have already established a claim (though they do not 
make it themselves) to our moral support, at least. 
Subsequently he disclosed his true political aim: 
Also I feel that some day we might find it advantageous to 
have, where they will be available to help us, several of these 
people who have faced the difficulties of the terrain and are 
familiar with the customs and dialects of the area.73 
In short, Paxton acknowledged the strategic and intelligence value of the 
71     Paxton to Canaltay, Mar. 29, 1952, in Records 18: 579.  
72     For full text, see Appendix 1.  
73     Paxton to Garret H. Soulen, Feb. 9, 1952, in Records 27: 278.      
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refugees from Xinjiang along with–or “rather than”–the moral value of helping free-
dom seekers. Without any doubt, such worth was also applicable to the Kazakh refu-
gees.  
In the end, Paxton’s appeals were accepted by high officials in Washington 
several months after his death in June 1952. The success of this endeavor should be 
attributed mostly to Henderson, who agreed with Paxton and who reminded Berry 
of these refugees although, since he was no longer in India, “this problem is not 
mine.” In his letter, Henderson described the point in symbolically:  
The problem of course is in part humanitarian. On the other 
hand, I am convinced that there is a strong possibility that the 
funds and time which we might be able to invest in assisting 
these refugees might yield a rich return to the United States.74  
 
4. The Escapee Program: Overt Humanitarian Aid for Covert Aims 
Escapee Program and “Phase B” 
With regard to the reception of Uyghur and Kazakh refugees and their re-
settlement in Turkey within the quota of the 1,850 “Settled Immigrants (İskânlı 
Göçmen in Turkish)” realized in 1952 through the efforts of İsa Yusuf Alptekin and 
Mehmet Emin Buğra, Alptekin indicated the significant preconditions of which the 
Turkish Government informed them. Immigrants must arrive on the Turkish border 
on their own expenses and the Turkish government would never sponsor their travel 
costs.75 Turkey opened its doors to the so-called “same origins,” but how did the Xin-
jiang refugees manage to raise such costs? Almost all of them were living in abject 
poverty in Srinagar and had asked Paxton for help. Asked this question, Kazakh ref-
ugees generally answer, both in published and oral form, that the National Council 
of Churches (Edmonds and Rugh) and the Red Crescent assisted their transfer from 
Srinagar to Bombay.76 Such a response is not wrong. In reality, these organizations 
conducted the transfer of the refugees, however, one-sided it was. To answer who 
really paid their costs and how, researchers must turn to Washington’s arguments in 
this regard. 
The State Department recognized the potential import of the Kazakh refu-
74     Henderson to Berry, Jan. 8, 1952, NARA, RG 59, Box 5645, NND 822910, 893.411/1-852.  
75     Kul, Esir Doğu, 2: 85, 88, 90, 94.  
76     For example, Oraltay, Hürriyet Uğrunda, 273–75; Doğru, interview by author.  
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gees and incorporated them into the Escapee Program. The United States Escapee 
Program (EP or USEP in short) was created by the Department of State in December 
1951 and was approved by President Truman in March 1952. This program aided 
those who fled communist oppression from behind the Iron Curtain.77 EP was a com-
prehensive relief program that supplied food, provisions, household goods, medical 
care, and vocational education. It also secured immigration to the third country for 
refugees or helped migrants with the interrogation and screening procedures and the 
process of local integration. The EP only operated small staff units in Western Ger-
many, Austria, Italy, Trieste, Greece, and Turkey to supervise all its projects, which 
were mainly managed through contracts with interested voluntary agencies. It was 
reported that as of March 1961, the EP had resettled 143,544 people in third countries 
and that it had integrated 34,544 people in their first asylum countries since its 
launch. The assistance offered by this agency aimed to “rebuild hope among refu-
gees,” showing them that they were not forgotten by the free world.78 
At the same time, however, the EP also purposed to shake Moscow, appeal-
ing to the “captive populations behind the Iron Curtain” that America and the free 
world were “still mindful of their tragic lot and have not forsaken them”79 and en-
couraging further defections from them. It was a kind of “zero-sum game whereby 
America’s gains represented the Kremlin’s direct losses.”80 According to Susan Car-
ruthers, who analyzed the concept of “escapee” and its liminality, the term could be 
defined as: someone who defected the Eastern bloc including the Soviet Union and 
its orbiting nations except East Germany, Yugoslavia, and communist China due to 
77     EP was mainly based on the Section 101(a)(1) of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, which 
authorized expenditure “not to exceed $100,000,000 of such appropriation for any selected 
persons who are residing in or escapees from the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, or the Communist 
dominated or Communist occupied areas of Germany and Austria, and any other countries 
absorbed by the Soviet Union either to form such persons into elements of the military forc-
es supporting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or for other purposes.” Mutual Securi-
ty Act of 1951, Public Law 165, 82nd Cong., 1st sess. (Oct. 10, 1951).  
78     Edward W. Lawrence, “The Escapee Program,” Information Bulletin: Monthly Magazine of 
the Office of the US High Commissioner for Germany, March 1953: 6–8; Roger W. Jones, 
“Department Supports Continuation of Refugee and Migration Programs,” Department of 
State Bulletin 45, no. 1157 (1961): 383–84; George L. Warren, “The Escapee Program,” Journal 
of International Affairs 7, no. 1 (1953): 84–85.       
79     Jones, “Department Supports”: 385.  
80     Susan L. Carruthers, “Between Camps: Eastern Bloc “Escapees” and Cold War Border-
lands,” American Quarterly 57, no. 3 (2005): 918.  
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Fig 2: EP’s flowchart81 
political oppression from / disaffection with the communist regime; an escapee was 
neither an economic immigrant nor an opportunistic non-anticommunist; therefore, 
escapees had their own dramatic narratives of crossing borders from the East bloc 
to the West, which could be utilized for propaganda proclaiming the latter’s superi-
ority;82 escapees were cotemporally accommodated in European camps. In fact, life 
in the camps was quite wretched and the transfers took a long enough time so that 
escapees were disappointed83 waiting to be resettled in the West or in other coun-
tries of the “free world” to rebuild their hope.84 The EP targeted those who were 
worthy of being an intelligence source and could help in the psychological warfare 
of the early cold war period, disguising its real interest with its “investment in hu-
manity.”85 Here, it should be marked that not all kinds of people who left the East 
81     Foreign Operations Administration, Escape to Freedom [Washington DC: Foreign Opera-
tions Administration, 1954]. 
82     Warren, “The Escapee Program”: 83; Carruthers, “Between Camps”: 930–32.  
83     Carruthers, “Between Camps”: 930–32.  
84     Ibid.: 934.  
85     Ibid.: 917, 923.   
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bloc, such as the refugees, displaced persons, economic immigrants, or ordinary mili-
tary deserters could enjoy the status of “escapee.” The nomenclature was selective, 
anomalous, and applied to those who were disaffected with the East bloc and deserv-
ing of American interest.86 
Prior to the EP, Truman’s Psychological Strategy Board designed “The Psy-
chological Operations Plan for Soviet Orbit Escapees,” code-named “Engross,” in De-
cember 1951. According to this scheme, the ostensible means for escapees such as 
employment, resettlement and care were named “Phase A,” which crystalized as the 
EP within four months. “Phase B,” on the other hand, was targeted at enticing more 
defectors/escapees and at better utilizing them in covert operations against the Soviet 
bloc. Such usage included their incorporation into the US military services and into 
other agencies such as the Voice of America and the CIA.87 According to the Opera-
tions Coordinating Board’s report on the EP in February 1954, the Department of 
State, Department of Defense, CIA, and the United States Information Agency 
viewed the EP’s specific benefits as providing:    
1. Propaganda material based upon FOA [Foreign Operations 
Administration]/USEP activities and as provided by individual 
escapees. 
2. Intelligence value information. 
3. Candidates for operational programs, both overt and covert. 
4. Special service support such as assistance in developing a co-
operative attitude in escapees during debriefing and through 
special handling of disposal cases referred by the operating 
programs insofar as feasible by an overt apparatus.88  
EP’s hidden goals such as the above have been partially disclosed in recent 
years. According to the AP’s investigation conducted in 2007, the American authori-
ties instituted the International Tracing Service, whose task was to go through Nazi 
documents and to use them to reunite families dispersed during WWII, and to screen 
86     Scott Lucas, Freedom’s War: The American Crusade against the Soviet Union (New York: 
New York University Press, 1999), 140; Carruthers, “Between Camps”: 918–19, 922–23.  
87     For the Operation Engross, see Gregory Mitrovich, Undermining the Kremlin: America's 
Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947–1956 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 78–
80; Lucas, Freedom’s War, 140–41; Carruthers, “Between Camps”: 920.  
88   Operations Coordinating Board, Report on the Examination of the Effectiveness of the Escapee 
Program in Meeting Objectives under NSC 86/1, Feb. 2, 1954, NARA, RG 59, Box 38, Entry A1 
1586C, NND 959007, no number.  
? 64 ?
                                          
 
EP files on the backgrounds of the escapees for the purpose of recruiting covert US 
spies.89 
The EP clearly articulated its political reasons for supporting refugees from 
communist countries. A memorandum entitled “Escapee Program Submission FY 
1954” and revised on October 17, 1952 stated the history of refugee relief in the fol-
lowing manner:  
The United States Government has traditionally taken a keen 
interest in the problems of refugees and escapees, because of 
the humanitarian considerations involved, as well as the politi-
cal, economic and psychological significance of these groups.90  
It is noteworthy that the EP emphasized “political, psychological warfare, and intelli-
gence interests” beyond humanitarianism.91 Such an emphasis coincides with Pax-
ton’s covert intentions with regard to the Uyghur and Kazakh refugees. 
The EP identified the importance of refugees in terms such as a) the cooper-
ation of individual refugees and “usefulness of the group as sources of intelligence or 
as participants in U.S. psychological warfare”; b) the neglect of escapees or their lack 
of hope would damage the US’s psychological warfare efforts against the USSR and 
its satellite countries; c) the reception, care, and resettlement of the refugees would 
provide a firm factual basis for the US’s psychological programs.92 The EP targeted 
select groups and applied a relatively small amount of money for relief. The applica-
tion of the EP in these areas would be “directed primarily toward assisting U.S. polit-
ical, psychological warfare and intelligence programs.”93 
  
EP’s Application to Kazakh Refugees 
Kazakh refugees matched such US interests very well. Memoranda written 
by two men, both named Edwin Martin, describe the reasoning behind the expansion 
of the EP to include Kazakh refugees. As previously mentioned, the EP did not in-
89      However, it failed to reach outstanding results. Arthur Max and Randy Herschaft, 
“Archive Catalogs Use of Cold War Refugees: ‘Escapee Program’ Covert Side Was Recruit-
ing Spies,” SFGate, Jan. 4, 2009, https://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Archive-catalogs-use-
of-Cold-War-refugees-3255775.php (accessed Nov. 13, 2018); DW Staff, “US Cold War Re-
settlement Program Used for Propaganda, Spying,” DW, Dec. 29, 2008, http://p.dw.com/p/
GOkK (accessed Nov. 13, 2018).  
90     U.S. Department of State, “Escapee Program Submission FY 1954,” in Records 27: 225.  
91     Ibid.: 227.  
92     Ibid.: 228–29.  
93     Ibid.: 230.  
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clude refugees from communist China at its inception. The first Martin, Edwin W. 
Martin of CA, wrote his colleague on October 27, 1952. Martin learned that the Refu-
gees and Displaced Persons Staff, Bureau of United Nations Affairs (UNA/R), had 
approached CA to extend the EP which had been limited to Europe into refugees in 
Hong Kong, South Asia, and the Near East. CA had also previously recommended 
such an expansion. According to Martin, CA felt that to continue the EP agenda in 
Europe while “neglecting Asia would be an untenable proposition,” and that there 
was an “important political and psychological advantages to be gained” in adopting 
the EP’s program in Asian areas. Further, the UNA/R was attempting to get approval 
from the Director of Mutual Security (DMS) for an immediate assistance project for 
around 300 Xinjiang refugees in Kashmir, namely the Kazakhs.94  
On the same day that the first Martin wrote his memorandum, the second 
Martin, Edwin M. Martin, Special Assistant for Mutual Security Affairs, wrote to 
John Ohly in DMS. This message represented the views of the Department of State 
with regard to a proposal to assist Kazakh refugees. At first, Martin indicated that “It 
is anticipated that this project [EP] will serve to advance United States national psy-
chological warfare, political and intelligence objectives.” He continued, “it is believed 
that assistance to this group of Sinkiang refugees in Kashmir is in the interests of the 
United States and, apart from purely humanitarian reasons, will have beneficial po-
litical effects.”  
Paxton’s devotion to arousing the interest of high officials in the Kazakh ref-
ugees can be seen in Edwin’s quotation from Loy Henderson, which has already 
been quoted above: “we might be able to invest in assisting these refugees might 
yield a rich return to the U.S.” In short, Paxton’s efforts finally reached one of the 
highest officials in the Department of State. These phrases also remind us of Paxton’s 
intention as expressed in his letter to Soulen as previously mentioned. 
What do “invest” and “return” mean here? Edwin M. Martin distinguished 
the Kazakhs from refugees in Europe, whom the EP should resettle in some third 
country due to over-population and local unemployment in Europe. On the contrary, 
Martin considered it possible to push for the local (in Kashmir) resettlement or inte-
gration of refugees “who prefer to remain close to their homeland.” Local resettle-
ment could be relatively low cost. He estimated that 147 refugees could be settled in 
94  Edwin W. Martin to Walter P. McConaughy, memorandum, Oct. 27, 1952, 
“Developments in Escapee Program,” in Records 27: 223.  
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Kashmir for $11,000 USD while $9,000 would be needed to establish the 153 refugees 
who had transited to Turkey, i.e., Hüseyin Teyci and the group that left Srinagar in 
October 1952. For this group, in fact, the above mentioned memorandum “Escapee 
Program Submission FY 1954” mentioned covering the deficit in their transportation 
cost.96 Per capita, the cost of the former option would be $75, and the latter would re-
quire $59. Martin concluded that “In Kashmir, local resettlement is a feasible and in-
expensive alternative, consistent with the wishes of many of the group.” With respect 
to the urban resettlement of 68 Uyghurs (Turki), he entrusted a voluntary agency for 
small loans for business, trading and crafting, the refund of which “would be applied 
to further work among Central Asian refugees.”97 
Such different aid resolutions depending on the group are mentioned in the 
above mentioned EP memorandum. This note recommended a combined migration: 
a local resettlement project for Xinjiang refugees as an “illustrative project for the Es-
95     Jacques Vernant, The Refugee in the Post-War World (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1953), 
744; House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Mutual Security of Act of 1954: Hearings on H.R. 
1449, 83rd Cong., 2d sess., 1954, 914, 925; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Mutual 
Security Act of 1954, 83rd Cong., 2d sess., 1954, S. Rep. 1979 reprinted in United States Code 
Congressional and Administrative News, 83rd Congress, Second Session (St. Paul, MN: West, 
1954), 2: 3232; Erkin Alptekin, Doğu Türkistan’dan Hicretimizin 40. Yılı (Kayseri: Erciyes 
Dergisi Doğu Türkistan Yayınları, 1990), 20, 30–36.  
96     U.S. Department of State, “Escapee Program,” in Records 27: 253. 
97     For full text, see Appendix 2.  
Departure in 
Eminent  
immigrant 
Immigrants  
to Turkey 
Total 
Remainders  
in Kashmir 
Aug. 1952 Hüseyin  Teyci 102 102 230 
Nov. 1952 
Ömer Çobanoğlu 
(Alibek’s group) 
78 180 152 
Jan. 1953 
Enver Koçyiğit  
(son of Sultan Şerif) 
20 families - - 
Oct. 1953 - - 253 97 
till Nov. 1953 ? 18 271 70 
till Mar. 1954 Sultan Şerif 32 303 65 
Jun. 1954 Alibek Hakim 59 362 6 (the Canaltays) 
Table 1: Process of Kazakh refugees’ resettlement from Kashmir to Turkey95  
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capee Program for the Near East and South Asia, subject to continuing study and de-
velopment, and to prior determination that such projects will provide maximum sup-
port for political, psychological and intelligence activities in Central Asia, both overt 
and covert.”98  
Martin’s resettlement plans were not realized. According to several data 
sources including the hearings before the committee of the House of Representatives 
and report of the Senate committee, the group that was expected to settle in rural 
Kashmir also gradually migrated to Turkey. As previously mentioned, the National 
Council of Churches was charged with transferring the Kazakh refugees from Srina-
gar to Bombay, and its headquarters at the World Council of Churches was also con-
tracted with the EP.99 Finally, in June 1954, Alibek and the last group of Kazakh refu-
gees departed, and only Canaltay’s family remained in Kashmir. 
 
Wedge into Soviet Russia 
Nevertheless, Edwin M. Martin’s aim of utilizing the Kazakh refugees as 
“political, psychological and intelligence” agents can be noted in the memories of 
Mansur Teyci, Hüseyin’s son. He recalled his childhood in Kashmir as follows: 
One day, my father, Alibek, Canaltay, and Sultan Şerif were 
invited to the house of a person connected to Indian intelligent 
service. My father took me there. I remember well there was a 
bicycle which I had never seen in Eastern Turkestan. After 
years I learned that they offered to supply efficient foods, 
clothes, house etc. if Kazakhs present them their youths. Indi-
ans intended to send these Kazakhs back to China wearing no-
mad clothes and to engage them in intelligence activity. This 
was an attractive offer. But my father refused perhaps for his 
naive character and I was sole son of him. The others showed 
interest, but due to my father’s refuse, this offer did not realize. 
Later Canaltay served in Indian intelligence service.100 
The exact reason why Kazakh refugees who had desired to remain in Kash-
98     U.S. Department of State, “Escapee Program,” in Records 27: 253–54.  
99   U.S. Foreign Operations Administration, Escape, 21. Besides the World Council of 
Churches, the Tolstoy Foundation and Church World Service also attended to the EP.  
100    Mansur Teyci, interview by author, Istanbul, Sep. 2013.  
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mir, like Alibek’s group, decided to migrate Turkey is still unclear.101 Of course, 
Turkish citizenship must have been attractive to them, but this reason is still insuffi-
cient in explaining why the refugees surrendered their hopes of remaining in Kash-
mir, which was close to their homeland, and which matched the second Edwin Mar-
tin’s expectations. 
 Because of this move, Washington could not accomplish the EP’s hidden 
aim, or initiate “Phase B” of utilizing Kazakh refugees for “political, psychological 
and intelligence” purposes in Kashmir as divulged by Mansur’s statement. However, 
it was very possible that some other refugees who had left Xinjiang in 1934 and had 
remained in Pakistan were recruited by the CIA for covert operations in Xinjiang. In 
his memoir, the former Chief Justice of Azad Kashmir High Court, Muhammad 
Yusuf Saraf, recorded the entrance of the Kazakh refugees into Kashmir. Years later, 
they dispersed through the northern parts of British India and in 1950–51, there exist-
ed a large number of Kazakh refugees in Jhelum, a city of Pakistani Punjab.102 After 
Pakistan entered the Baghdad Pact in 1955, these refugees disappeared and Saraf de-
scribes their news in the following manner: 
after we had entered into the American-sponsored Military al-
liances, they [Kazakh refugees in Jhelum] suddenly disap-
peared from the town and rumours have been current persis-
tently that they were picked up by the Central Intelligence 
Agency of the United States, smuggled out of Pakistan and af-
ter training, at least some of them were smuggled into the So-
viet Union for spying. In December, 1973, this writer [Saraf] 
met two Kazak shop-keepers in Mecca who had been among 
these refugees. They confirmed that some had “gone” back to 
Soviet Russia.103 
 Of course, this report was merely based on hearsay and the refugees in Jhe-
lum may have emigrated to Turkey or may have returned to Xinjiang of their own 
free will. The same applies to escapees in Western camps, who were disillusioned 
with the West and “found the “free world” less than hospitable” and who re-
101    Doğru told the author just Turkish Government suddenly gave them visas. Doğru, inter-
view by author.   
102    Muhammad Yusuf Saraf, Kashmiris Fight-for Freedom (Lahore: Ferozsons, 1977), 1: 572–
73.     
103    Ibid.: 572.     
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defected to the East in the mid-1950’s.104 221 of the 798 Uyghurs who fled Xinjiang 
with Alptekin and who reached Ladakh returned to Xinjiang because of lack of fi-
nances and other reasons. Subsequently, 45 refugees returned to Xinjiang from Srina-
gar. More than 100 refugees also returned to Xinjiang from a pilgrimage to Mecca be-
cause of financial reasons and because of the false rumor of improved conditions in 
their homeland.105 
Thus, it was quite natural that refugees returned to Xinjiang because of the 
difficulties and disillusionments they encountered in their first asylum country. The 
more refugees re-defected, the better suited they were for covert operations. The dis-
satisfaction of the re-defectors with the “free world” could have been also exploited 
to mask their intelligence and psychological warfare roles for “Phase B.” 
It may be pertinent at this juncture to recall the instance of Soviet counter-
intelligence against the Turkestan National Union, the outstanding anti-Soviet organ-
ization of Western Turkestani émigrés in Western Europe and Middle East. In 1931, 
an exile from Tashkent named Bahrom Ibrohimov wrote Mufti Sadriddin Xon, the 
representative of the Union’s Mashhad branch. He claimed to be a writer who was in 
a relationship with a secret organization, and who had escaped from Turkestan fear-
ing arrest. Sadriddin Xon verified Ibrohimov’s statement as accurate and forwarded 
it to the Union’s headquarters. Thus, Ibrohimov penetrated the Union and subse-
quently adopted the new name Mahmud Oyqorli. He worked as Sadriddin Xon’s 
secretary in Afghanistan. However, Oyqorli, whose real identity was GPU agent, 
took over the Union’s Kabul branch and eliminated his boss Sadriddin Xon in 1935. 
He managed the Union’s operations encompassing Iran, Afghanistan, North India, 
and Xinjiang under the supervision of Soviet spy networks for 24 years. Some of the 
former anti-Bolshevik guerrillas fell to Oyqorli’s death traps. It was only after 1954 
when Oyqorli returned to the Soviet Union that his identify was fully exposed.106 
Why then, would Washington not conceive of sending Xinjiang refugees back home 
to infiltrate their native country under the guise of being disillusioned with Pakistan/
India or the “free world” as re-defectors? Why would the US, at the very least, not 
assist these refugees and keep them close to the Sino-Indian borderland in the name 
of local integration? 
104    Carruthers, “Between Camps”: 934–35.  
105    İsa Yusuf Alptekin to Paxton, Jan. 28, 1951, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 115, 19–20. 
106    A. Ahat Andican, Turkestan Struggle Abroad: from Jadidism to Independence (Haarlem: SO-
TA, 2007), 361–62, 364, 370–80, 445, 545–48, 601–5.  
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Returning to Saraf’s testimony, it is noteworthy that the Kazakh shopkeep-
ers affirmed that some refugees had returned to Soviet Russia, not to China’s Xin-
jiang. Similarly, Donald Ebright of the NCC of India also observed Russia’s advance 
into Xinjiang, writing that “Russia needs Central Asia’s resources for her global con-
quest!”107 It may hence be said that Kazakh refugees tended to be regarded as fleeing 
from Soviet Russia.108 
A travel journal written by American naturalist and explorer John Stanwell-
Fletcher provides interesting narrative of Kazakh refugees in this context. While trav-
eling through Kashmir, John heard by chance of the refugees led by “Hassantaj” and 
Sultan Şerif in Kargil before they entered in Srinagar. “Hassantaj” willingly accepted 
John’s offer of an interview. According to “Hassantaj,” he had originally lived in 
eastern Kazakhstan and had been a leader of the first 25 Kazakh men, women, and 
children who had openly resisted communist policies. They were forced to flee to 
Urumqi, and were soon driven out from that location by the MVD (Ministry of Inter-
nal Affairs of USSR) security troops to Barköl. There, they were joined by another Ka-
zakh group led by Sultan Şerif and months later they began to flee toward the Takla-
makan Deserts, the Tibet mountains, and finally reached India. “All of the first twen-
ty-five,” “Hassantaj” said smiling briefly, “who had fled with me from Kazakhstan 
were with me still.”109 
In fact, there was no Hasan Teyci among prominent refugee leaders. This 
term must be a misspelling of the name Hüseyin Teyci (Qŭsayïn Täyzhĭ), whose 
background was wholly different from the above narrative. Hüseyin was born in 
Saertuohai (Sartohay), Qinggil, in north Xinjiang in 1900 and left Barköl in 1938 as a 
result of Sheng Shicai’s purge. The Kazakhs led by Hüseyin settled in the mountains 
in southern Suzhou. As a result of armed clashes with Ma Bufang’s army in 1940, 
however, they wandered to southeast Xinjiang (Ruoqiang) and west Qinghai 
(Wutumeiren). After 1943, Hüseyin Teyci’s group moved to Gasköl in northwest 
Qinghai close to Xinjiang. After this transition, Hüseyin worked to increase his live-
stock, and sheltered other defectors form Xinjiang such as Alibek Hakim, Yolbars 
Khan, and Douglas Mackiernan.110 When Osman Batur was defeated and the Peo-
107    Ebright, Free India, 135–36. 
108    As to the Soviet factor on Kazakh migration, see Chapter 3 in this book.    
109    Stanwell-Fletcher, Pattern, 127–35.  
110    For Mackiernan and his follower Frank Bessac’s stay in Timurlik of the Gasköl region, 
see Godfrey Lias, Kazak Exodus (London: Evans Brothers, 1956), 170–72; Thomas Laird, Into 
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ple’s Liberation Army advanced to Huahaizi in March 1951, Hüseyin Teyci, Delilhan 
Canlatay, and Sultan Şerif’s groups decided to flee to India via Tibet.111 
In short, it is difficult to regard Hüseyin Teyci as resistant to Soviet policies. 
Hence, his narrative was just a means of arousing John’s pity.112 Hüseyin Teyci knew 
very well how to frame people who fled Xinjiang, not from Soviet Kazakhstan as 
“freedom seekers” who would be ideal for America’s “zero-sum game” to display its 
superiority against the Soviet Union. The adoption of Kazakh refugees to the expand-
ed EP was not a passing whim for Washington. Assisting them was expected to drive 
a wedge not only into communist China, but also into the Soviet Union’s eastern 
front while the original EP targeted the escapees from the Iron Curtain. As Paxton 
wrote to Henderson, they were eligible for “investment.” 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper focused on the various forms of American aid extended to the 
Kazakh refugees in Kashmir from the local agencies to the highest political echelons 
of Washington. In the early stages of this support, missionary organizations and an 
anthropologist politicized the Kazakh refugees parallel to the humanitarian assis-
tance. Apart from their humanitarian motives, the Americans also found a way to fit 
the refugees into their strategy against the communists. Such approaches were made 
under the disguise of relief. In particular, the role played by Hall Paxton was crucial 
from the viewpoint of encompassing them within the “not forgetting you” affect. He 
struggled to maintain the refugees’ favorable attitude toward America and in doing 
so (donation, arrangement of scholarship, etc.), he sublimated the poor Kazakh refu-
Tibet: The CIA’s First Atomic Spy and His Secret Expedition to Lhasa (New York: Grove Press, 
2002), 127, 146–53; Frank Bagnall Bessac, Susanne Leppmann Bessac and Joan Orielle Bessac 
Steelquist, Death on the Chang Tang: Tibet 1950; The Education of an Anthropologist (Missoula, 
MT: University of Montana Printing & Graphic Services, 2006), 71–82; Oraltay, Hürriyet 
Uğrunda, 216–18. Before his departure, Mackiernan tore a five-dollar bill into two pieces and 
placed his and Alibek’s thumbprints on each portion. Mackiernan gave one to Alibek and 
told him to show it to a certain American official in Delhi. However, Mansur Teyci ques-
tioned this famous episode and alleged that Alibek tore the bill after arriving in Kashmir. 
Teyci, interview by author.  
111    Ömer Kul ve Emin Kırkıl, “Doğu Türkistan Kazak Türkleri Liderlerinden Bir Portre: 
Hüseyin Teyci Alkenbayoğlu (1900–20 Eylül 1963),” Trakya Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi 
Dergisi 1, sy. 2 (2011): 107–11, 113, 122; Haruhira Abe, “Rurō kazafu kaimetsu no kiroku,” 
Chūgoku kenkyū geppō 56, no. 1 (2002): 23–24, 29–32.  
112    Mansur Teyci also laughed off his father’s narrative. Teyci, interview by author. 
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gees into recipients of America’s “investment” or to the position of hopeful candi-
dates of the US’s covert “Phase B” operations. Kazakh refugees also repeatedly ex-
pressed their ties with Paxton and America. From Washington’s perspective, it was 
difficult to accept these refugees into America. Here the EP emerged to fulfill not on-
ly overt aid to them in humanitarian concern, but also covert aims to utilize them for 
America’s own strategic interest. Though the EP offered two options for refugees, mi-
gration to a third country or local integration, the latter was apparently more desira-
ble for the Kazakh refugees and for the sake of American interests.  
If only the results are considered, the Americans could not sufficiently uti-
lize the Kazakh refugees within the EP framework. Almost all of the Kazakh refugees 
left Kashmir, so the EP merely ended up covering their migration expenses and 
failed to retain them in Kashmir as hopeful candidates for “Phase B.” Further, soon 
after they settled in Turkey, conflicts emerged between some Kazakh migrants and 
the Uyghur refugees headed by Alptekin, and even between groups of Kazakhs. In 
December 1955, CA pointed out that “Turkey has already had some difficulty owing 
to factionalism within the groups settled in Turkey.”113  
Nevertheless, American involvement in the Kazakh refugee problem, and 
with political refugees from Central Eurasia in general, would take a new, more sta-
tistical shape in the form of Radio Liberty in Munich. Previous studies on this anti-
communist broadcasting service have not paid requisite attention to its recruiting of 
young refugees or the children of other Turkic-origin diasporas such as Hasan Oral-
tay or Ali Akış who were active in the Idil-Ural Movement of Volga Tatars, and 
Settar Makbul Çoban, whom Alptekin listed as a candidate to study in America and 
who did so.114 Some employees of Turkic origin were transferred to academic careers 
in the post-Soviet years and are still engaged. This overlap between the extension of 
“Phase B” and the national struggles of Turkic émigrés and refugees overseas needs 
more cautious investigation. 
Today, the core generation that experienced the Kazakh “exodus” has al-
most passed away and the second generation born in Turkey is also aging. The fact 
that Kazakh refugees in Kashmir had attracted the attention and aid of missionaries, 
anthropologist, diplomats, high-level politicians, and overt–but well calculated–
113   Douglas Forman to Kendrick, memorandum, Dec. 9, 1955, “Proposed Trip by Repre-
sentative of Yolbars Khan to Visit Sinkiang Refugees in Various Foreign Countries,” in Rec-
ords 19: 67.  
114    Kul, Esir Doğu, 2: 16.  
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kindness has already fallen into oblivion. It is almost forgotten that this small, mar-
ginalized group of people had been deemed to be vested with a peculiarity that was 
worth receiving the EP investment for “psychological warfare, political and intelli-
gence objectives,” namely “Phase B.” In this sense, the migration of the Kazakh refu-
gees to Turkey was accomplished as the very product of the early cold war period.   
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Appendix 
 
1. J. Hall Paxton’s Letter to Loy Henderson115 
American Consulate 
Isfahan, Iran 
November 14, 1951 
 
Dear Mr. Ambassador: 
 
As you perhaps already know, I have been much interested in helping the 
group of Turkis who fled from Sinkiang with Mohammed Emin Bugra and Isa Yusuf 
Aliptekin [sic] and are now dragging out a poor existence in Srinagar. 
I have been told that, as soon as their case was presented to you in New Del-
hi, you called to the Department’s attention the importance of not permitting the op-
portunity to slip for our Government to show an interest in them. Their case is simp-
ly this: they are bitterly anti-Communist and have endured tremendous hardships 
and suffered heavy losses, in both wealth and lives, in their escape over the Karako-
rum Route from Sinkiang to Ladekh and are now friendless in a strange land. 
While it is clear that they do not have the slightest claim on the United 
States, still it is natural that, in view of the aid given by our country to others who 
have opposed Soviet Imperialism, they should turn first to us for succor and might 
hope to receive somewhat more consideration both as a group and as individuals 
than has yet been shown them by the American Government. 
In addition to deserving, at least, moral support from us, I feel it to our na-
tional interest to win the disproportionate propaganda credit that would accrue from 
the smallest gesture of aid to them. This group now seems deserted tiny financial in-
vestment (a few thousand dollars in an outright gift to alleviate their misery until 
something more permanent can be worked out for them, in the way of their resettle-
ment in the New World), this news would reverberate far and wide throughout Mus-
lim Central Asia to our credit and the Russian discredit. 
In March 1950, when I was leaving Washington on another assignment, I 
was told by a member of the Policy Planning Staff that: it had been decided to bring 
115    Paxton to Henderson, Nov. 14, 1951, NARA, RG 59, Box 5645, NND 822910, 893.411/1-
852. 
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the entire party to the United States for permanent residence; funds had been allocat-
ed; their place of settlement in America determined; visa requirements arranged for 
and they all should be arriving by ship at New York within less than four months; Isa 
Yusuf Aliptekin would be flying in first and, on his arrival, I should be notified and 
assigned to assist him in planning for the reception of the group. However, since that 
time, not a word further from my friend in P. – not even an acknowledgement to my 
letters enquiring about his undertaking. 
I have continued to hear from Isa every few months and others of the group 
from time to time, and there appears to be nothing known to them in prospect, either 
proximate or long term, for their relief. 
Naturally I do not wish to prejudge what should be done for these refugees, 
but their case has not yet been heard and, in view of the possible wide repercussions 
that might result from even limited action on our part, it surely deserves a hearing. I 
have not yet tried to organize the pertinent facts – perhaps it could not be done ade-
quately without a visit to the group now in Kashmir, which seems unlikely for me at 
present – but I think you will agree that their problems deserve more sympathetic 
consideration than they have yet been given. 
I should appreciate your advice as to the best means of having this matter 
weighted in executive councils where the problems of these displaced people and 
our national interest in giving them some aid could really be considered. When we 
are handing out millions of dollars for, sometimes, weaker causes and so large a por-
tion of our aid to Asia is earmarked for China it seems that these people should not 
be forgotten. 
While Government action is being delayed I would like to explore other re-
sources that might be available for these unfortunates, rejected by both the slave 
world and the free. I feel confident that some of them would make as good sheep-
herders as the Basques, whom I hear are being specially imported to fill vacancies in 
that industry in Wyoming, Montana and Idaho. Might not the Senators from these 
states and possibly also from Utah, Nevada, Arizona, or New Mexico be interested in 
Turki oasis-farmers who have had experience in growing crops with little irrigation 
facilities? What are the channels through which these needs for immigrants can be 
ascertained? 
Another possible source of assistance is suggested in the clipping I enclose 
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from a recent radio bulletin. Would an appeal to philanthropic groups such as these 
be advisable? 
In the meantime I wish to make another personal contribution and should 
appreciate your assistance in transmitting it to New Delhi. I am enclosing a personal 
check made out in your name. I am doing this because a check payable to the 
“American Embassy, New Delhi” was returned, last year, for substitution of the 
name of an officer there, as it was inconvenient to take it through the official ac-
counts.116 Would you be so kind as to endorse and mail it to the appropriate person 
in India for transmission to the “Turkestan Refugee Committee, Srinagar, Kashmir” 
under whatever safeguards may be appropriate to ensure that it does all the good 
possible at the best rate of exchange? 
Forgive my bothering you with this problem, so remote from our present 
concerns, but I feel it to be of considerable importance. In view of the reports which 
have reached me of your personal interest in the plight of these unfortunates, I am 
encouraged to hope that you may assist me in finding some available way to help 
these good friends. 
Sincerely yours, 
 
J. Hall Paxton  
 
2. Memorandum on EP’s Adaption to Kazakh Refugees117  
MEMORANDUM FOR: John H. Ohly 
Office of Director for Mutual Security 
 
SUBJECT: Resettlement of Sinkiang Refugees now in Kashmir 
 
I would like to explain further the views of the Department of State concern-
ing certain aspects of the recent proposal to assist to Sinkiang refugees in Kashmir. 
It is anticipated that this project will serve to advance United States national 
psychological warfare, political and intelligence objectives. With respect to the Gov-
ernment of India and local authorities in Kashmir, it is believed that assistance to this 
group of Sinkiang refugees in Kashmir is in the interests of the United States and, 
116    Forman to Paxton, May 21, 1951, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 119, 21. 
117    Edwin M. Martin to John H. Ohly, memorandum, Oct. 27, 1952, “Settlement of Sinkiang 
Refugees now in Kashmir,” in Records 27: 216–18. 
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apart from purely humanitarian reasons, will have beneficial political effects. The 
government of India is already heavily burdened with the problem of resettlement 
of the millions of refugees from Pakistan, and will welcome United States assistance 
in caring for the needs of this small additional group. This action on the part of the 
United States will provide concrete demonstration, in a part of India where the 
Point 4 Program is not operative, of the continuing humane concern of this country 
for the plight of the oppressed peoples around the world. Ambassador Loy Hender-
son has recently written the Department from Tehran concerning this group: “... I 
am convinced that there is a strong possibility that the funds and the time which we 
might be able to invest in assisting these refugees might yield a rich return to the 
U.S.” 
With respect to the areas from which these people have fled, it is important 
to note that, pursuant to present National Security Council policy, it is in the United 
States interest to encourage and exploit areas of potential friction between the USSR 
and Communist China. Sinkiang Province, which has long been a source of conten-
tion between Russia and China, is a notable example of such areas of political fric-
tion. In addition to its strategic location, Sinkiang has had a long history of re-
sistance to both Chinese and Russian encroachment. The racial minority groups liv-
ing there are among the most intensely nationalistic of Central Asia. Various ethnic 
groups in Sinkiang have made repeated appeals to United States officials, notably 
the late J. Hall Paxton, for United States moral, economic and political support. Con-
sidering the little help extended by the United States to these people, it is fortunate 
and, indeed, surprising that an opportunity still remains for cultivating their friend-
ship and political assistance at relatively little cost. Intelligent assistance is not only 
desirable but, in the light of United States policy objectives, is imperative if the la-
tent potential is to be utilized. In this connection, particular attention should be in-
vited to the usefulness to the United States of a program providing assistance for 
settlement of anti-Communist escapees reasonably near the area from which they 
fled. 
It should be emphasized, with reference to the questions which have been 
raised concerning the local resettlement aspects of the project, that the primary ob-
jective of the Escapee Program is to re-establish the individual escapees on a self-
sufficient basis, so that he may regain his dignity and self-respect, and will no long-
er require relief assistance. In Europe, the countries of first asylum happen also to 
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be, with one or two possible exceptions, areas of surplus population. The means, 
therefore, for assisting the escapee must in general be onward migration to areas of 
expanding employment opportunity, such as Canada, Australia or Latin America. 
The Escapee Program has not, in consequence, engaged to any great degree in pro-
jects to resettle escapees locally in their European countries of refuge. Resettlement in 
Europe, however, has been recognized from the outset of the program as a possible 
alternative under certain circumstances. President Truman, in his message to the 
Congress of March 24, said: “Supplemental care and overseas migration do not, how-
ever, constitute all that should be done for those who escape from Eastern Europe. A 
substantial number of them want to stay in Europe and should have the chance to do 
so. They should be welcomed in Europe and given the opportunity to make their in-
dividual contributions to the free world.” 
In Kashmir, no similar unemployment exists among the local population to 
make the onward movement of refugees mandatory. This presents the definite alter-
native of local resettlement or integration for those refugees who prefer to remain 
close to their homeland. In this instance, the local resettlement can be accomplished 
by homestanding in rural Kashmir, and establishment in small business in Srinagar, 
at a per capita cost roughly equal to that of movement to Turkey. In my letter of Sep-
tember 15, 1952 to Mr. Harriman concerning this matter, it was pointed out that 153 
refugees can be moved to Turkey for $9,000, or approximately $59 per capita, and 147 
would be resettled locally per $11,000, or approximately $75 per capita. With refer-
ence to the method of administering the urban resettlement project for 68 Turkis, it is 
anticipated that small land or partnership arrangements would be worked out in in-
dividual cases by the administering voluntary agency. Where practicable, funds 
would be recovered from the local resettlers, and would be applied to further work 
among Central Asian refugees under provision of the contract between the United 
States Government and the administering voluntary agency. 
In both the European program and the Kashmir project the objective is that 
of permanent establishment of the refugee under conditions favorable to self-
dependence. In Europe, local conditions of unemployment among the indigenous 
populations recommend onward movement. In Kashmir, local resettlement is a feasi-
ble and inexpensive alternative, consistent with the wishes of many of the group. The 
proposal represents a practical solution, in light of prevailing local conditions, to this 
problem of selecting the means best calculated to serve the objective of the program. 
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With reference to the question of recurrent requests of this nature, I would 
call your attention to the fact that a small program for the Near East, South Asia and 
the Far East is included in the FY 1954 Escapee Program submission. Illustrative 
programs have been developed to specify the type of projects contemplated for 
these areas, and in the Near East local resettlement is clearly one of the means to be 
considered. It is assumed, therefore, that this matter will shortly be placed directly 
before the Congress for approval on a continuing basis. In the interim, I would 
again recommend your approval of this urgent project as being wholly consistent 
with the objectives of the Escapee Program as defined in basic Psychological Strate-
gy Board documents and an administered under section 101(a)(1) of the Mutual Se-
curity Act of 1951, as amended, and within the intent of legislative authority already 
available under section 303(a) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as 
amended. 
Edwin M. Martin 
Special Assistant to the Secretary 
for Mutual Security Affairs 
CLEARANCES: 
SOA118:FDCollins 
CA:EWMartin 
CA:WOAnderson 
UNA119: 
UNA:UNA/R120:RMCashin:mit 
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118    Office of South Asian Affairs, Department of State.  
119    Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Department of State.  
120    Refugees and Displaced Persons Staff, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Department of 
State. 
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